"Little by little, the child develops," wrote an undergraduate in a friend's cognitive development class, and so, for the most part, it is. In most respects, a 3-year-old is better than a 2-year-old, and a 2-year-old is better than a 1-year-old. Whether improvement is gradual or steep, it is rare to see children take a step backward. When children do take that rare step backward, researchers stand up and listen. The three target articles in this issue are a look at some of those rare moments. "U" shaped progressions, in which good performance is followed by worse performance that is finally followed by better performance should remind us (if perhaps in reverse) of the famous riddle of the Sphinx: what at first walks on 4 legs, then 2, and finally 3?
tually muscle mass catches up, and little Susie is off to the races. What has changed is not her mind but her body.
Should we take the stepping story to be the paradigm explanation for U-shaped development? Probably not. Another case which Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen mention is one that I am more familiar with, children's overregularization errors (Marcus et al., 1992) . Children make transitions from "correct performance" (in the form of correct irregular past tense verbs like sang, went, broke, etc.) to overregularizations (errors like singed or break in which a child treats an irregular verb as if it were regular) to eventual adult mastery. The initial period of "correct performance" seems to rely on little more than rote memory, while the transition to "incorrect performance" relies on a cognitive innovation, the acquisition of the default rule of English past tense formation-when in doubt, add the -ed morpheme to the verb stem. 1 By the same logic that would lead you to inflect to shend as shended, a child inflects break as breaked if she is unfamiliar with (or unable to retrieve) broke. Adult mastery appears as the child has more practice with specific irregular verbs. In this case, the U-shaped curve really is a product of at least three cognitive changes: the realization that English marks past tense obligatorily (it's ungrammatical to say "Last week Mommy takes me shopping"), the realization that -ed is the morpheme of choice, and the gradual practice with specific exceptions.
The none-too-surprising conclusion is that every U-shaped phenomenon must be studied independently. Phenomena that have the appearance of U-shaped development should never be taken at face value-the base rates are too low. In most behaviors, performance really does steadily improve, and some seemingly U-shaped phenomena may reflect little more than measurement error. But when such phenomena can be rigorously replicated, their origins must be understood not as a matter of doctrine but as matter of good old-fashioned empirical study. Just as improvement in an athletic endeavor, swatting a golf ball, say, can come from brain (improved motor-cognitive circuitry), brawn (bigger muscles), or the environment (better swatting with Big Bertha), U-shaped curves (which after all are just improvements followed by declines and further improvements) may derive from a multiplicity of factors-a point on which Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen and I are very much in agreement.
One voice that is notably absent from these articles, is that of Noam Chomsky, and his distinction between competence and performance, the idea that we can parcel out knowledge from factors like memory and attention (e.g., Chomsky, 1975) . Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen's account of the A-not-B error, for instance, could be taken as a claim that children have the competence to pick the right box but fail for performance reasons, gaps in memory, failures in inhibition, and so forth; the stepping research could be taken as evidence that the cognitive underpinnings of stepping are built in, showing up only when performance factors (like muscle power) allow them to be exhibited. Yet surprisingly, Chomksy appears only once in these three articles, on the very last page of Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen-in an argument against the competence-performance distinction. In my view, Gershkoff-Stowe and Thelen's argument misrepresents the nature of the distinction itself. Against the viability of the competence-performance distinction, they ask rhetorically, "What is the child's 'real' competence in the fragile A-not-B or object-naming tasks?"-their point being that performance is so variable across tasks and situations that there could be no general truth about how well a child might do on a family of differing tasks, because performance is always context-dependent. But competence is not something that inheres in a task, it is something that inheres in a mental representation. All tasks (or measures thereof) are indices of performance, and unfortunately, until we can read the circuits of the brain directly, performance measures are the only cloudy lens through which we as psychologists in the early 21st century can infer competence; we simply do not currently have direct access to the machinery that underlies behavior. But competence is not about how well a child (or adult) does but about what cognitive structures or knowledge that person can bring to the task. Babies step not just because the environment is right or their muscles strong enough but because their brains have the right sorts of "programs"; U-shaped changes in task results could as easily reflect changes in those programs (competence) as in "performance" factors like memory or muscle strength. The competence-performance distinction remains a useful tool when we try to determine what's in a U.
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